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ABSTRACT. Interpretations involve relating facts nomically. "Candidate B's receiving the majority of votes 
tabulated was an act of theft" is a paradigm, since it presupposes an explanation in terms of personal agency and 
intention. At the core of explanations are subjunctive conditionals or universal generalizations supporting such 
conditionals, and we may explicate the notion of an interpretation in such terms. Can subjunctive conditionals then 
ever be acceptable basic premises? As we may distinguish causal, personal, legal explanations, so we may 
distinguish causal, personal, i.e. empirical subjunctives from legal and perhaps other subjunctives. In each case, we 
may identify a belief-generating mechanism—empirical intuition versus pragmatic intuition—that generates basic 
beliefs. We may argue that a subjunctive belief is acceptable if the mechanism is presumptively reliable. In this 
paper, we carry this out for causal subjunctives and causal intuition—empirical intuition in its causal employment. 
We believe this issue is advanced by recent work in naturalistic epistemology, namely Hilary Kornblith's Inductive 
Inference and Its Natural Ground. We develop the implications of this approach for the acceptability of causal 
subjunctives as basic premises. 
1. Introduction.   
A classic distinction in rhetoric identifies three types of questions that may be raised over 
some disputed issue: 
An sit — Did something happen? — Did candidate B receive a majority of the votes as 
tabulated? 
Quid sit — What sort of thing happened? — Was candidate B's receiving a majority of 
the tabulated votes an honest result or election fraud? 
Quale sit — What is the value of what happened? — If the election was fraudulent, were 
those responsible justified in stealing the election? (Compare Kruger 1975: 137.) 
Answers to these questions constitute three distinct types of statements—descriptions, 
interpretations, and evaluations. We believe that determining whether a statement may be taken 
as an acceptable basic premise in an argument—a premise thath is not argued for on the basis of 
other premises, at least in the course of that argument—involves centrally determining the type 
of statement involved.1 Indeed, we propose three questions for determining premise 
acceptability: 
 What type of state is it? 
 What source vouches for it? 
 Does this voucher create a presumption for the statement? 
That is, in light of the answers to the first two questions, would the burden of proof be 
shifted to a challenger to show why the statement should not be taken as a premise? In (2000), 
we argued that the description/interpretation/evaluation distinction is appropriate for classifying 
contingent or logically non-determinate statements. 
                                                 
1.. We have discussed these issues in (1991: 344-47). 
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Rhetoricians have characterized interpretations as raising issues of definition. This strikes us 
as misleading on two grounds. First, it is a commonplace that some analytic statements are true 
by definition. But intuitively, they are not interpretations. Secondly, some statements contain 
technical terms, e.g., 
 That berm is less than 5' wide. 
Unless we understand the definition of `berm,' we shall not understand the statement. But 
given the definition, 
 `Berm' means `the shoulder of a road' 
the sentence, 
 That shoulder of the road is less than 5' wide 
makes the same statement, which thus states straightforwardly whether something is the case. It 
is a description, not an interpretation. However, the rhetorical characterization contains a crucial 
insight, if we think not of linguistic meaning—what might be given through a definition of a 
word—but meaning in the sense of putting in perspective. This accords with Sproule's 
characterization of interpretations as placing facts into categories, relating them, placing them in 
perspective. (Sproule 1980: 142, 144.) More specifically, meaning in this sense involves relating 
facts nomically, in particular giving explanations. Taking 
 Candidate B's receiving the majority of votes tabulated was an act of theft. 
as a paradigm of an interpretation, we see that this statement presupposes an explanation of the 
fact of candidate B's receiving a majority of the votes. It explains the fact in terms of personal 
agency and intention, with an imputation of personal responsibility. 
But this explanation itself involves an interpretation. It relates certain actions either on the 
part of candidate B or his partisans to a system of intention involving goals of some sort. The 
actions become intelligible to us in light of these intentions. The explanation thus asserts both 
that certain actions happened and that one or more individuals had certain intentions—matters of 
description—and that the intentions and actions were nomically related, the interpretation proper. 
But what of the statement claiming or asserting this nomic relation? We believe that the 
statement could be cast into the following form or at least would support such a statement: 
If agent A were to have a conscious purpose to bring about goal G and were to believe that 
doing M were (part of) the (optimal) means to bring about G, then A would do M. (Compare 
Freeman 2000: 153.) 
Thus the core explanatory statement either is or supports a subjunctive conditional. We 
regard this as highly significant. Explanations involve nomic or lawlike generalizations of a 
universal or statistical sort. But it is the hallmark of such generalizations to support subjunctive 
conditionals. At the core then of explanations in general are subjunctive conditionals or universal 
generalizations supporting such conditionals. Rhetoricians, Sproule in particular, have identified 
a number of types of interpretations. We may ask then whether these various types may be seen 
as expressing subjunctives. May some types of interpretations, even though they do not express 
such subjunctives, be nonetheless defined in terms of those subjunctives? Can the classification 
of interpretations overall be systematized in light of the subjunctive? Looking at certain other 
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paradigms of interpretations, causal and dispositional statements, suggests a positive answer to 
this question. 
Heating pure water to 100°C at air pressure of sea level causes it to boil. 
Clearly this can be paraphrased as 
If pure water were to be heated to 100°C at air pressure of sea level, it would boil. 
Sugar is soluble in water. 
Likewise this statement may be straightforwardly paraphrased to make the implicit 
subjunctive explicit: 
If sugar were placed in water, it would dissolve. 
In (200x) we develop a positive answer to this question. Reviewing that answer is beyond 
the scope of this paper. But in light of that answer, the issue of whether interpretations may ever 
be acceptable basic premises involves at core the issue of whether subjunctive conditionals can 
ever serve as basic premises. How may we then advance that issue? 
2. Types of Explanations, Types of Subjunctives, and Intuition 
The key to approaching acceptability for interpretations as basic premises is determining 
whether subjunctives may under certain circumstances be properly basic beliefs. Having 
connected subjunctives with explanations, the next step is to distinguish types of explanations on 
the basis of how their covering law generalizations come to be discovered and thus on the basis 
ultimately of the belief-generating mechanisms involved. We may identify two major types of 
explanation as causal and personal. In a causal explanation of some event or phenomenon, the 
occurrence is explained in terms of some antecedent event or phenomenon and a certain disposi-
tional property or properties of the substances involved in that event. 
1. The match lit because it was struck. 
This explanation appeals to a certain dispositional property of the match which spells out 
certain conditions, individually necessary and jointly sufficient, for the match to light. 
2. If the match were struck with a force of a certain magnitude (or greater), in the presence 
of oxygen, the match being dry, then it would light. 
This explanation thus appeals to a nomic connection between striking a match and its 
lighting, expressible through a subjunctive conditional, together with the fact that the match was 
struck. Since this explanation seeks to explain an event in the material world through some 
antecedent event and some physical regularity, it is also a physical explanation. Physical 
explanations clearly are a subclass of causal explanations. 
By contrast, personal explanations appeal to the powers, beliefs, purposes, or intentions of 
conscious, personal agents. (Swinburne 1996: 21-22.) 
3. King Henry VIII sought to annul his marriage to Catherine of Aragon in order to remarry 
and father a male heir. (Compare Nagel 1961: 19.) 
This explanation is personal, attempting to render King Henry VIII's action understandable 
in light of his reasons for it, which involve goals he has consciously intended and chosen. Not all 
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explanations appealing to the psychological states of an agent need appeal to that agent's 
conscious intentions, however. If one said that 
4. The accused murdered the victim out of a consuming anger brought about by years of 
taunting. 
we are not explaining an action as intentionally chosen to accomplish some goal, but rather 
as resulting from certain psychological "springs of action." (Compare Nagel 1961: 19.)  
We are dealing with the motives rather than the reasons for action. This is a causal 
explanation, albeit one appealing to a psychological rather than a physical cause. Explanations 
dealing just with motives or other psychological sources of action are causal explanations. 
Personal explanations appeal to reasons and not just to motives.  
We can identify another type of explanation. Consider: 
5. Jones received $10,000 because his late grandmother bequeathed him that amount of 
money in her will. 
Here we certainly have an explanation of why Jones received $10,000. We could make this 
explanation explicit in the classic deductive nomological pattern of many physical 
explanations—or at least in a syllogistic nomological pattern, since the law here 
6. If one has been bequeathed a certain amount of money, one receives that money upon the 
demise of the person making the bequest. 
 is defeasible. But unlike physical explanations, the law here is not a law of nature but a matter of 
statute law. We have then a legal explanation in this case rather than a physical causal 
explanation. 
Legal explanations differ in one central respect from the causal and personal explanations 
we have already distinguished. The covering generalization appealed to is not a matter ultimately 
of empirical discovery but is rather given in or derivable from some body of statute law. One 
does not discover that signing a contract creates legal rights and obligations they way one 
discovers that signing the contract lowers the amount of ink left in the pen. Legal explanations 
are a paradigm of types of explanation appealing to given as opposed to empirically discovered 
covering generalizations. Consider some classification scheme, for example a scheme for some 
branch of taxonomy. One could explain why an individual is of some genus by pointing out that 
the individual is a member of a species that the taxonomic scheme subsumes under the genus. 
Prescinding from any justification of the classification system and appealing to that system as 
given, we have here what we might call an explanation via classification. Such explanations, like 
legal explanations, thus appeal to some given generalization. 
This survey reveals that for epistemological purposes we may distinguish two fundamental 
types of explanations depending on whether their covering generalizations come to be known or 
are ultimately supported "from below" through experience of the events and persons in the world 
around us, or "from above" through understanding some nomic system. Causal and personal 
explanations involve some apprehension of general connections in the world around us resulting 
in an empirical albeit nomic belief or accepting an empirical nomic statement. Legal explana-
tions, by contrast, are based on our apprehension of general connections given in some system of 
statute law. 
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This leads us to an epistemological classification of subjunctives. As we have distinguished 
causal, personal, legal, and perhaps other types of explanations, so we may speak of causal 
subjunctives, personal subjunctives or subjunctives of freedom, legal subjunctives. More 
broadly, we may distinguish empirical subjunctives, including causal and personal subjunctives, 
from what we might call pragmatic subjunctives of which legal subjunctives are a paradigm case. 
In approaching the question then of whether subjunctives are ever properly basic beliefs, we 
should separate empirical subjunctives from pragmatic subjunctives. In each case, we believe we 
may identify a belief-generating mechanism that generates properly basic beliefs. We believe we 
should call these mechanisms empirical intuition and pragmatic intuition. 
That we denominate both of these mechanisms as forms of intuition gives us a key to 
understanding how they operate and how we may assess the reliability of their operation. As 
Cohen points out, in the way certain analytic philosophers use the term, intuition concerns "what 
counts as a reason for what." (Cohen 1986: 73) To use Toulmin's terminology for the layout of 
arguments, intuitions concern warrants, the principles by virtue of which we get from data to 
claim. Intuition is one way in which warrants are grasped, and since warrants, properly 
understood as inference rules, are implicit in an argument rather than stated explicitly, (Compare 
Toulmin 1958: 100), intuition may be the principal way of grasping warrants. What does this 
have to do with subjunctive conditionals? Corresponding to the inference rule 
From   Fx 
We may take it that Gx 
is the generalization  
(∀x)( Fx ⊃ Gx) 
But this clearly is not an accidental generalization. It supports a subjunctive conditional, 
namely 
 (∀x)( Fx → Gx) 
So corresponding to the warrants of inferences are generalized subjunctive conditionals. To 
grasp the warrant is to come to believe at least implicitly the corresponding subjunctive 
conditional.  Thus if a type of intuition is a mechanism for grasping the warrants of arguments of 
a certain type, it is also the mechanism for generating beliefs that the corresponding subjunctive 
conditionals or universal generalizations of subjunctive conditionals hold. Furthermore, what 
bears upon the reliability of the inference warrant bears upon the acceptability of the subjunctive 
conditional. If one can reliably infer a conclusion from certain premises according to a given 
inference pattern, then one can take the corresponding subjunctive as a premise in some further 
argument. The reliability of intuition to grasp reliable warrants and the reliability of intuition as a 
mechanism generating beliefs expressed in subjunctive conditionals amounts to the same thing. 
Hence we may investigate the presumptive reliability of intuition as a belief-generating 
mechanism by investigating its presumptive reliability in grasping warrants. 
Making contact with one further structural distinction in Toulmin's layout of arguments 
indicates the fruitfulness of this approach. Toulmin distinguishes between warrants, which 
explain why data are relevant to claim, and backing for those warrants, which may be brought 
forward to establish why a warrant is acceptable, why in Toulmin's words the warrant has 
authority or currency (Toulmin 1958: 103.), why we are in fact licensed to move from those data 
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to that claim. We may think of the backing as the input on which some form of intuition intuits 
that something is a reason for something else, that from certain premises we may infer some 
conclusion. Thus the backing is the input for the mechanism generating subjunctive beliefs. So 
we may expect to get insight into the reliability of these belief-generating mechanisms as we get 
insight into the reliability of the corresponding inferences given how they are backed. 
Furthermore, as Toulmin points out, how warrants are backed differs widely from field to field. 
Above we distinguished different types of subjunctives corresponding to different types of 
explanations. Various types of explanation correspond to various fields of argument. We should 
expect the inferences and their warrants to be backed in different ways and thus modes of 
intuition as subjunctive belief-generating mechanisms to operate differently in different fields. 
Thus we should expect our task of assessing whether these modes of intuition are presumptively 
reliable to be much more straightforward if we can concentrate on just one field at a time and on 
how inferences in those fields are backed. Due to reasons of space, in the remainder of this paper 
we shall discuss just the field of causal arguments. 
3. Causal Intuition as a Belief-Generating Mechanism 
By means of causal intuition as a belief-generating mechanism, we come to believe certain 
subjunctive conditionals or their universal generalizations that express or indicate causal 
relations. I propose that the operation of causal intuition can be resolved into two factors: 
detection of covariation and imposition of an interpretive category. In the general instance, that 
category will be causal dependency. What do each of these factors involve? In nature, some 
features regularly occur together, F is generally accompanied by G, if not universally, then with 
some statistical uniformity (although not necessarily vice versa). Such occurring together is 
covariation and the ability to recognize this is covariation detection. 
We may not only come to believe that there is a constant conjunction here, we may come to 
apprehend F as an independent variable and G as the dependent variable. In other words, we may 
come to perceive F as a relevant variable with respect to G. This will involve an intuition of 
agency involved with F. For example, one may notice that dropping a stick is always accompa-
nied by a noise. But one may further apprehend dropping the stick as the independent variable 
and making a noise as the dependent variable. In apprehending this, one is apprehending 
dropping the stick as the causal agent in this case. But this means that we have brought a certain 
interpretive category to our experience, namely that nature has relevant variables. Nature's 
having relevant variables means that there are independent and dependent variables objectively 
in nature, i.e. that there are objective causal dependencies between agent and that acted upon, 
between cause and effect. 
I believe that we can understand the operation of causal intuition in the general case, where 
the category imposed is that of causal dependency, on analogy with the determinable/determinate 
distinction or as in a sense moving from the determinable to the determinate. To say that in 
nature there are <independent variable, dependent variable> ordered pairs is in effect to predicate 
a determinable of nature. But on the basis of observing a particular covariation pattern, F with G, 
I may come to perceive < G, F> as a particular instance of co-variation, that  < G, F> is a 
determinate falling under this determinable. By experience, I move from the determinable pattern 
to the determinate instance. 
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We have said that in the general instance with causal intuition, the category imposed is 
causal dependency. But there is a special case that is very relevant to the issue of assessing the 
reliability of causal intuition. We have spoken of covariation as if it were detected in individual 
independent-dependent variable pairs. But in nature, there occur clusters of covariant properties, 
sets of properties that tend to occur together, what Kornblith following Boyd calls homeostatic 
property clusters. This notion is straightforwardly illustrated. At the level of observable 
properties, we may easily recognize that some tend almost invariably, even uniformly, to go 
together. For example, if something is an apple, it will have skin and flesh, each of a certain 
texture, small brown seeds, a shape within certain roughly anticipated parameters. Furthermore, 
as Kornblith points out in (1993), empirical evidence “suggests that we are, indeed, quite good 
detectors of multiple, clustered covariation.” (Kornblith 1993: 101.) In such cases, one can 
impose the category not of simple dependency but of natural kind. Instances of these clusters of 
covariation will be seen as instances of some natural kind. 
This has very specific implications for the operation of causal intuition. As the psychologists 
Medin and Ortony point out, “People act as if their concepts contain essence placeholders that 
are filled with ‘theories’ about what the corresponding entities are.” (Medin and Ortony 1989: 
186; quoted in Kornblith 1993: 71.) For our purposes, let us say that natural kind concepts do 
contain essence placeholders filled with theories about what is essential—causally essential—to 
the natural kind. These theories may be very preliminary. But what they do at the least is to allow 
us to divide the observable covariant properties into those seen to flow causally from the essence 
and those that may be accidental. That is, the theory allows us to identify among the properties in 
the covariant cluster those that are dependent variables, the effects of independent variables 
which constitute the essence of this natural kind. The theory may, but need not, characterize what 
those independent variables are. In general, they will involve nonobservable properties dealing 
with the internal structure of instances of the natural kind. The more developed the 
characterization, the less preliminary the theory. 
As Kornblith develops in (1993), by means of our experience and these natural kind 
concepts, we may come to make projections. For example, suppose I observe in a zoo that a 
female platypus lays eggs. From this I project from something's being a female platypus to her 
being an egg-layer. I thus acquire the corresponding subjunctive belief that if something were to 
be a female platypus, she would be an egg-layer. In generating this subjunctive belief by 
intuiting according to natural kinds, we may again see a move from determinable to determinate 
analogous to the move with intuitions of causal dependency. Part of or closely bound up with the 
essence of a species of living thing is having a mode of reproduction—reproducing in some way 
or other. My experience indicates that for the platypus, this mode is egg-laying. Thus the 
observable property of egg-laying is the determinate for platypuses of this determinable. What is 
also significant here is that part of the essence of a natural kind is that the determinate of this 
determinable is unique to the kind. It is not the case that some members of the species reproduce 
in one way, others in another way. Hence once my experience discloses the specific mode of 
reproduction of the species, I may project that mode to the entire natural kind. This is significant 
for determining the presumptive reliability of causal intuition, to which we now turn. 
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4. Presumptive Reliability of Causal Intuition 
Let us begin by investigating whether causal intuition is presumptively reliable in its 
operation with natural kinds. The issue of its reliability when intuiting causal dependency in 
simple covariation can be straightforwardly assessed by contrast. Kornblith (1993) gives us an 
argument for the overall reliability of causal intuition when making projections according to 
natural kinds. Recall our illustration of a homeostatic property cluster through certain observable 
properties of an apple that stably go together. Examples of stable collections of properties can be 
easily multiplied. Such collections are subsets of wider stable collections that include 
unobservable properties also. Furthermore, having these unobservable properties will explain 
why objects have the observable properties they do and why these properties standardly occur 
together in an object. Further yet, these unobservable properties may explain why certain 
configurations of properties can hold together and others are not possible (causally possible). 
Given this understanding of a homeostatic property cluster, we may lay out Kornblith's argument 
quite straightforwardly: 
1. Certain features of objects reside in homeostatic clusters. Therefore 
2. There are real natural kinds in the world—the world is objectively divided into natural 
kinds. 
3. Human beings apprehend the world as divided into natural kinds. 
4. Human beings are sensitive to those features of objects tending to reside in homeostatic 
clusters, i.e. human beings are sensitive to the indicators of objective natural kinds. Therefore 
5. Natural kinds as apprehended by humans match up with real kinds in nature. 
6. What is apprehended as essential to a real kind is causally essential to that kind. 
7. Humans project, i.e. make inferences, on the basis of what is essential to natural kinds. 
Therefore 
8. These projections, inferences are reliable at least to a significant degree. 
Evaluating this argument is beyond the scope of this paper.2 Suffice it to say here that the 
basic premises can all be defended and the inferential steps shown sound. The issue concerns 
what this argument shows. Does (8) justify the claim that we may presume causal intuition to be 
reliable when making projections according to natural kinds and thus to be reliable in generating 
the subjunctive beliefs corresponding to the warrants of these projections?3 Has Kornblith shown 
that the reliability of causal intuition is high enough to justify our accepting a particular causal 
subjunctive which is the product of causal intuition—taking it as a basic premise in an argument 
on the basis of its being vouched for by causal intuition? Three problems must be dealt with in 
this connection. The first two arise from Kornblith's own discussion. Indeed the second involves 
problems in covariation detection he himself considers. The third raises a deeper issue for causal 
intuition in general, but paradoxically points the way to a resolution of these three problems. We 
 
2.. We present our evaluation in full in (200x), Chapter 8.5. 
3.. Besides presumptive reliability, we may also ask whether causal intuition in this employment generates 
basic beliefs. We present our argument for that point in (200x), Chapter 8.5. 
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shall also be able to discuss the reliability of intuiting causal dependencies in simple covariations 
in connection with the second and third questions. 
First, as Kornblith admits, reliability of empirical intuition is a function of what fills the 
essence placeholder. "In having our inferences driven by a sensitivity to the deeper properties 
which unite a kind, we are thereby drawing on what we know about the kind's essence. Insofar 
as that knowledge is accurate, our inductive inferences will be reliable." (Kornblith 1993: 106, 
italics added.) But in a given case of causal intuition, what guarantee is there that this knowledge 
will be accurate? May we presume this in general? May we presume it when certain conditions 
are satisfied? What are those conditions? 
Secondly, certain examples that Kornblith discusses suggest that humans may be 
overzealous in detecting covariation. This arises both in examples where covariation detection is 
data-driven and where it is theory-driven. Data may suggest covariations which are not there and 
these suggestions erroneously accepted. Theories may suggest that having certain properties 
causally follows from the essence of some natural kind where this is false, yet projections are 
erroneously made according to these suggestions. But surely incorporating these mistaken 
suggestions affects the reliability of causal intuition both in intuiting according to natural kinds 
and in intuiting causal dependencies. 
Before considering the third problem, let us consider this second. The answer to the first will 
emerge from this discussion. We can best deal with this problem by looking at the problematic 
examples Kornblith considers. For the data-driven case, he presents the example of a population 
of 150 people where two-thirds have a certain disease, one-third do not. There is also a certain 
symptom. Two-thirds of the people who have this symptom also have the disease, while two-
thirds of the people without the symptom also have the disease. Hence, at least in this population, 
the symptom is no sign of the disease. The statistics about this population are presented in the 
following table: 
 
  DISEASE A  
  Present Absent 
 Present 20 10 
SYMPTOM 
X 
   
 Absent 80 40 
 
(see Kornblith 1993: 97). Concentrating just on the X/A or X/A and X/-A cells, many persons 
claim that the symptom is a sign of the disease, while others, concentrating just on the -X/A and  
-X/-A cells, claim that lack of the symptom is a sign of the disease. 
For the "theory" driven case, undergraduates were shown a series of forty-five drawings 
representing persons. Clinicians have asked patients to make such drawings in diagnosing 
psychological disorders, believing that drawings that manifest certain features indicate certain 
psychological problems. "For example, paranoid individuals are said to give emphasis to the 
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eyes; those worried about intelligence are said to draw larger heads; those concerned about their 
sexual identity give prominence to genital areas." (Kornblith 1993: 99.) Experimental work has 
disconfirmed these associations. With the undergraduates, each drawing was presented 
accompanied by a diagnostic label. Yet the drawings were carefully done so that those labelled 
paranoid did not give any more prominence to the eyes than drawings bearing other labels, and 
similarly for the other labels. There were no correlations to see, but the students claimed to see 
them nonetheless, exactly those correlations the clinicians would expect.  
This wholly useless diagnostic instrument is thus a product of common association, and 
the fact that we tend to associate certain clinical problems with features of the body gives 
rise to the illusory correlation. (Kornblith 1993: 100.) 
Notice what the undergraduates are doing in this case. A clinical diagnostic category is in 
effect a natural kind term. The common association of a category with a type of drawing as 
symptom is (part of) a theory filling the essence placeholder. The undergraduates make their 
erroneous projections that the drawings do in fact display these symptoms given these diagnostic 
labels driven by these erroneous theories. So the problem of theory-driven erroneous covariation 
detection is included in the fist problem for causal intuition, that of unreliable theories filling the 
essence placeholders. Can we say that causal intuition is presumptively reliable if mistaken 
theories can fill the essence placeholders in natural kind concepts and thus drive causal intuition? 
We must note one further fact about the theory-driven example whose salience will appear 
in due course. The undergraduates did not know that the drawings were used by clinicians as 
diagnostic tools. Thus they did not know of the evidence showing these tools unreliable and 
disconfirming their commonly accepted associations. On the other hand, clinicians did know of 
the disconfirming evidence, yet they continued to use the drawings in making diagnoses. Thus in 
continuing to accept these associations, the clinicians were disregarding evidence already in their 
purview. They were accepting diagnoses grounded on less than all the evidence available to 
them. 
This is true also of the data-driven case. Consider the symptom-disease chart above. To see 
that there is no covariation, positive or negative, between the symptom and the disease, one 
needs to look at the chart as a whole. Attention just to those cells where the symptom is present 
or just to those cells where the symptom is absent results in a mistaken judgment of covariation. 
But the point is that those presented with the chart have all the evidence in front of them and are 
making their mistaken judgment of covariance on the basis of less than all the information before 
them. 
This leads directly to the third problem for the presumptive reliability of causal intuition. 
Whether or not one takes account of evidence before oneself is a matter of will. Thus, as Cohen 
points out, there is a significant difference between the mechanism (or mechanisms) generating 
causal beliefs and the mechanisms of perception or memory. The will can influence the 
operations of the causal mechanism whereas it cannot so influence the descriptive mechanisms. I 
am appeared to in a certain way and straight off form a perceptual belief. Unless I also have 
evidence that my visual mechanism is not functioning properly or that I am in some peculiar 
environment for which my visual apparatus was not designed, my belief is also acceptable. My 
having the belief is a presumptive reason for my taking it as a premise. (Compare Cohen 1992: 
130.) But, as Cohen points out, mistaken causal beliefs—at least about how Nature works—are 
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quite common and therefore causal beliefs about nature's operations are not by themselves 
presumptively acceptable. (Cohen 1992: 130) He diagnoses the problem this way: 
What is the crucial difference between the kind of mechanism that generates 
presumptively acceptable beliefs and the kind that generates beliefs which are not 
presumptively acceptable?... Wherever there is standardly some opportunity for the 
intrusion of a voluntary element into the mechanism, the kind of belief generated is not 
presumptively acceptable, because a mistake may be made in the discharge of this 
voluntary element. (Cohen 1992: 130-31) 
Does this show that causal intuition is never presumptively reliable, that there is never a 
presumption for the beliefs generated by causal intuition? We believe that Cohen's negative 
diagnosis may be too hasty. Suppose there was a presumption that no mistake was made in the 
discharge of the voluntary element. Then why should there not be a presumption in favor of the 
resultant belief? But what would it mean for there to be a mistake? For Cohen, the mistake is in 
not subjecting the intuited causal law or causal dependency to test, in not acquiring further 
information. The question concerning the reliability of causal intuition becomes whether there 
always, in every context, is this obligation to seek this further information. This is a question in 
the ethics of belief. Do the examples in W.K. Clifford's classic paper indicate how we might 
answer this question? 
Consider the ship owner. Practically the first thing Clifford tells us is that of his ship,  
"He knew that she was old, and not over-well built at the first; that she had seen many 
seas and climes, and often had needed repairs. Doubts had been suggested to him that 
possibly she was not seaworthy." (Clifford 1886: 339) 
Clifford is not faulting the ship owner for not gathering further evidence, but for flagrantly 
disregarding the evidence before him. This contrasts with his second example, where agitators 
are at fault simply for responding to rumors about certain individuals and for having done no 
investigation to ascertain the truth of those rumors. Here the fault seems clearly to be not 
gathering proper evidence. 
We may argue, however, that the agitators also were wilfully disregarding information in 
their evidential situation. They believed that certain individuals had manipulated "the laws of 
their country in such a way as to remove children from the care of their natural and legal 
guardians; and even of stealing them away and keeping them concealed from their friends and 
relations." (Clifford 1886: 340) This is an ascription of personal responsibility. Since the 
agitators accepted this interpretation on the basis of rumor and thus the word of others, the belief 
is not an instance of personal (as opposed to causal) empirical intuition on their part. But surely 
this mechanism of taking one's word is not reliable in general. Reliability requires the context in 
which testimony is received to include certain evidential features. The absence of those features 
raises the question of whether there is any presumption for a person's word. But surely if a word 
is just rumor, those features are absent, and their absence is part of the evidential situation. So 
like the ship owner, the agitators were wilfully disregarding evidence that undercut the presump-
tion for their ascription of responsibility. 
This leads to the following question for causal intuition. Are the situations in which causal 
intuition may be employed always such as to call the presumptive reliability of causal intuition 
into question? Do such situations always contain evidence or raise questions whose wilful 
 
 
 
Can Interpretations Ever Be Acceptable Basic Premises? 12 
 
disregard would undercut any presumption for causal intuition? The question needs clarification. 
Consider the ship owner again. That his judgment of the ship's seaworthiness is false is not 
merely a logical possibility. It is not just that there is some possible world in which the ship goes 
down. Given the owner's evidence, the ship's not being seaworthy is a causally nomic possibility. 
The mere fact that one can conceive of an interpretive belief arrived at through causal intuition to 
be false is not sufficient to call the presumptive reliability of causal intuition into question. There 
must be a real possibility of its falsehood. To substitute logical for real possibility here would be 
to engage in epistemic scrupulosity. 
Contrast the ship owner with the undergraduates. On the basis of commonly accepted 
associations, the students "recognized" features in the drawings, exaggerations of certain parts of 
the body, which were not there in actuality. They were projecting on the basis of these 
associations. Recall that the students did not know of the evidence discrediting the common 
associations on which they were basing their projections. The evidentiary situation for these 
students then is different from the situation in both of Clifford's examples. The ship owner knew 
of evidence that the ship was not seaworthy. The agitators knew that the source of the allegations 
was rumor and not trustworthy testimony. Clearly the ship owner had an epistemic duty to secure 
sufficient counterevidence—if such could be found—that the ship was sound; the agitators had 
an epistemic duty to gather reliable evidence—if any existed—for the allegations before they 
would be within their epistemic rights to accept these judgments. But did the undergraduates 
have an epistemic duty to gather evidence for the associations underlying their projections, 
which were apparently vouched for by common sense? Unlike the undergraduates, the clinicians 
were aware of disconfirming evidence and thus had an epistemic duty to gather counterevidence 
to justify the association before projecting according to it. But did the undergraduates have a 
similar duty? Why, in the absence of evidence, should they question the association? Would it 
not be an epistemic counsel of perfection, enjoining scrupulosity, to say that they did? So it 
seems that the undergraduates' evidentiary situation did not call into question the presumptive 
reliability of their belief-generating mechanism whereby they projected from the diagnosis to the 
symptom. To be sure, there was some evidence before these students that their projections were 
faulty. Careful inspection, possibly with the aid of rulers, could show that the drawings did not 
manifest the features the students "saw" in them. But where was there evidence in the situation 
that this amount of care in perceptually observing the drawing was called for? 
Notice that there are two places where the will can enter into the operation of causal 
intuition proceeding according to natural kinds. On the basis of observations made, one sees 
certain objects as being of a natural kind and on the basis of the theory occupying the essence 
placeholder one projects from certain observed features of the observed instances of the natural 
kind to members of the kind in general. Hence the will can affect the amount of perceptual 
information taken into account and it can affect whether or not to accept the nomic principles 
making up the theory substituted for the essence placeholder. Evidence that in perceiving the 
situation further relevant information was overlooked or that evidence counting against the 
nomic principles incorporated into the theory constituting the essence of the natural kind was 
disregarded undercuts the presumption of reliability of causal intuition in those cases. But where 
there is no such evidence, why should we say that causal intuition is not presumptively reliable? 
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By contrast, let us consider an example of the intuition of a causal dependency on the basis 
of observed covariation.4 Suppose one observed bees returning on a number of occasions to a 
container of sugar water placed on a blue card and formed the belief on the basis of this 
experience that bees were sensitive to the color blue, i.e., if something were a bee, it would be 
able to discriminate the color blue. Is this belief formed reliably and if not, are there evidential 
factors in the situation that undercut the presumptive reliability of the belief? The answer to the 
first question is negative and its explanation gives a positive answer to the second. Being able to 
discriminate color—blue at least—is just one of a number of possible relevant variables which 
could explain the observed bee behavior. Bees might be returning to the card because they 
recognized its shape or relative location, or because they are responding to the smell of the 
sugar-water in the container. The alleged nomic connection is questionable precisely because of 
this multiplicity of nomically possible relevant variables. To be justified that color discrimination 
explains the bees' behavior one would need to rule out the other variables. The problem here is 
failure to discharge the burden of proof raised by these other variables. 
Contrasting the platypus example considered earlier and the bee example is instructive in 
showing why there is a presumption of reliability in the first case but not in the second. In the 
platypus case, part of the theory filling the essence placeholder of the natural kind term 
"platypus" is the causal regularity that given the internal physiological structure of platypuses—
whatever that might be, members of the species reproduce in a certain particular way—whatever 
that is. This regularity is quite preliminary. It does not tell us the specific way in which 
platypuses reproduce or how that is tied to certain physiological features. But it does assert that 
this mode of reproduction will be uniform and not variable across the species. Hence, when we 
perceive a platypus reproducing by laying eggs, we are justified in projecting this feature to 
platypuses in general. 
Contrast this with the bee case. Here certain regular bee behavior is observed. But here we 
do not have as part of our theory of the essence of this natural kind that bees are so constituted 
physiologically that returning behavior is determined by one and only one variable. Such a claim 
of regularity would incur a significant burden of proof. Our theory of the essence does not 
propose some determinable of which "responding to blue" is the determinate. Rather than 
projecting according to a theory of determinable/determinate uniformity incorporated into the 
essence theory, the object of the inquiry here is to determine what causal regularity concerning 
color discrimination should be incorporated into the theory of the essence of this natural kind. 
Since many relevant variables may affect color discrimination, this question cannot be settled 
through empirical intuition alone. Testing the relevant variables is required and the resultant 
belief justified by the evidence these tests generate is an inferred, not a basic belief. That other 
relevant variables are causally possible is part of the evidential situation. Thus to accept a 
judgment before these tests have been completed is to disregard part of the evidence in the 
situation. 
That the internal physiological structure of members of a species determines some uniform 
mode of reproduction for that species seems to follow from the very notion of a species. Given 
this understanding of species, there should be a presumption for this causal claim. Other non-
basic causal claims may enter into the theory filling the essence placeholder in some natural kind 
 
4.. This example is based on Cohen's discussion of von Frisch's experimental work on bees in (1977: 129-33). 
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term. For example, our theory might contain a causal law received on testimony from a trusted 
authority as apparently was the association accepted by the undergraduates. The point is that as 
long as there is a presumption for this causal law, the presumption of reliability for causal 
intuition proceeding according to this law is not compromised. 
Given these considerations, we may argue for the conditional reliability of causal intuition 
proceeding according to natural kinds. We should like to call this a Reidian argument, since it 
parallels how we can argue for the presumptive reliability of sense perception on Reidian 
grounds. For Reid, it is by virtue of certain principles of our constitution that certain sensations 
or features of our sensations become signs of external qualities. We should be acting against our 
nature to reject these natural signs or to regard them as unreliable. Indeed, not only would we be 
going against our nature, Reid feels it would be impossible to carry out this rebellion. Reason 
cannot certify this reliability. But to appeal to reason for such certification is wrongheaded. The 
presumption of reliability for sense perception is not a matter of reason but of common sense. 
Hence, unless we are confronted with evidence to the contrary, we may concede the genuineness 
or reliability of the signs manifested in perception. Indeed, these natural signs, the fact that 
features of our sensations or how we are appeared to suggest or are signs of qualities in external 
objects, are first principles of our nature. 
All reasoning must be from first principles; and for first principles no other reason can be 
given but this, that, by the constitution of our nature, we are under a necessity of 
assenting to them. Such principles are parts of our constitution, no less than the power of 
thinking. (Reid 1983: 57-58.) 
As long as in taking account of the information which will back, in Toulmin's sense, the 
projection made on the basis of a natural kind, one has not wilfully suppressed information, and 
as long as one has not admitted unjustified causal laws or nomic principles into one's 
understanding of the essence of the natural kind, then to project according to that kind and to 
form the corresponding subjunctive conditional beliefs is part of our constitution. That causal 
intuition in this employment is reliable is thus a first principle as are the particular beliefs 
generated in this way. They form part of the basic premises from which we reason. Propositional 
justification appeals ultimately to such premises, which do not themselves need propositional 
justification or to be justified by reason. 
The condition then for the presumptive reliability of causal intuition proceeding according to 
natural kinds is the right operation of the will in both places where it can enter into the operation 
of this mechanism. Notice that in some instances the condition is simpler, since the will is not 
operating to admit principles into the essence. We may speak of the developmental nature of 
essence concepts. Initially an essence just indicates that a natural kind has an "outside" and an 
"inside," letting us identify some of the observable properties of the instances of that kind as 
following from the internal structure and thus being essential. We do not come to accept that the 
essence has this structure on the basis of evidence. Our recognizing this structure is immediate, 
like coming to form a perceptual belief on the basis of being appeared to in a certain way. The 
will does not enter here. As our understanding of the internal structure increases, so does the 
richness and precision of the essence concept. But surely there is a presumption for the initial 
minimal filler for the essence placeholder. If our argument has shown anything, it is that 
discriminating an inside from an outside, regarding natural kinds, is part of our constitution. So 
long as there is a presumption for any additional nomic principles admitted into the essence, a 
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presumption which could be ensured by accepting these principles on the basis of presumptively 
reliable testimony or proper evidence generated through tests, so long as the will operates 
according to these principles—and backing information has not been wilfully disregarded—the 
presumption for causal intuition's reliability is maintained. 
Notice how the situation is different with respect to intuiting nomic connections simply on 
the basis of detecting covariation. One observes that one property occurs conjointly with another. 
Is this simply an accident of what has been observed or does it indicate a nomic connection? 
Unlike the case with natural kind terms, letting us distinguish essence from accident, there is no 
theory to discriminate "essential covariation" from "accidental covariation." To be confident that 
this intuited connection were genuinely nomic, one would need to know that no other relevant 
variables needed to be taken into account in this situation. But then the belief in the nomic 
connection would be acceptable on the basis of this propositional evidence and not as a basic 
belief. Thus in this employment there is not a presumption for causal intuition as a mechanism 
generating basic beliefs as there is with causal intuition guided by natural kinds. 
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